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Belarus based on cooperation rather than sanctions.
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The EU’s sanction regime against Belarus and the government of President Alexander Lukashenka has
been in place for more than 16 years.  In an abridged version of a brief originally published by the
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Ondrej Ditrych writes that while the sanctions
illustrate the EU’s objections to the regime in Belarus, all the available evidence has shown that
they have been largely ineffective in their objective of changing the political climate in the country.
He argues that the best way to make sanctions effective may be to terminate them, and instead
establish a roadmap for engagement with the country that makes EU assistance and cooperation
conditional on positive reform.
Since 1996, the EU has imposed, suspended, lifted and re-imposed a variety of sanctions on Belarus. All evidence
seems to suggest that these sanctions are not working. It is true they may well show the Union’s ‘actorness’ in
international relations and, notably, in its own neighbourhood. They also signal legitimate moral indignation and
ostensibly punish the regime, which can be seen as an end in itself, and possibly also act as an indirect means of
promoting norms of good governance worldwide. Last but not least, they may represent political tools to prevent the
regime from taking steps that it would otherwise have contemplated. But, in terms of primary objectives, the
sanctions appear to be ineffective: political prisoners remain behind bars (unless they bend to pressure and, like
Andrei Sannikov, ask for a presidential pardon), and the regime has not created a more permissive political
environment.
What is the cause of this? First, the regime enjoys relative
stability due to the economic lifeline provided or facilitated
by Russia – special energy prices, subsidies (amounting
to approx. 70 per cent of foreign direct investment),
privileged market access and easy access to credit – and
the existence of a fragmented and isolated domestic
opposition. Second, the regime perceives relations with
EU as a dependent variable of Belarus’ own ambitions (but
also concerns) vis-à-vis Russia. Third, the very design of
the sanctions may be to blame. Their core objective is not
merely a change of policy (e.g. unconditional release of
political prisoners) but rather of politics, as reflected in the
demands to make changes to the electoral code to assure
free and fair elections, and to introduce freedom of
expression and assembly. At the same time, the sanctions
are limited insofar as they conform to the definition of
‘smart’ or targeted sanctions, with no sectoral embargoes or similar ‘crippling’ measures being implemented (243
individuals are currently on the travel ban list, and assets have been frozen to 32 entities associated with three
business tycoons – Vladimir Peftiev, Yuri Chyzh and Anatoly Ternavski).That EU restrictive measures do not work
does not mean that they are useless. But instead of recommending that the black lists be perfected or expanded
(e.g. to include other prominent businessmen like Aleksandr Moshensky or Aleksandr Shakutin), or that entire
sectors like oil products be targeted (which would bring a triple adverse effect: increase dependence on Russia,
negatively impact society, and cause further economic losses for EU member states), their timely suspension might
well be taken into consideration. Paradoxically, the best way to make sanctions effective may be to terminate them.
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This should not be an isolated step but rather the result of a bargaining process which also reviews the current policy
of ‘critical engagement’ (with ‘engagement’ being limited to civil society). The EU did attempt to use both carrot and
stick previously, in 2008-2010. The infamous ending of that détente – caused by the violent repression of political
protests in the aftermath of the presidential election in December 2010 – left a sour taste and undermined faith in
the idea that a lasting solution could be achieved. As a result, the list of targeted persons and entities grew
dramatically, possibly to punish the regime for ‘cheating’ the EU. Now it is time to move beyond that position and
adopt a more pragmatic policy.
Admittedly, from a geopolitical perspective, the window of opportunity that was once open is now closed. But while
relations between Minsk and Moscow have normalised, President Alexander Lukashenka is wary of excessive
dependence on Russia and continues to see relations with the EU as a constituent part of his balancing act. At the
same time, there seems to be a more acute awareness that changes in governance need to be made to guarantee
the regime’s longer-term survival. In this regard, EU assistance would be most welcome. Lastly, the Union is
becoming an ever more important trading partner for Belarus, increasing its lead over Russia as the most important
destination for its exports – a fact which could propel the regime to seek better relations.
A ‘smart’ opening move could be to suspend the restrictions on Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makey as both a gesture
of good will and a practical means of facilitating diplomatic dialogue. It is crucial that any package then proposed to
Minsk includes two items: first, clear and explicit assurances that closer cooperation is conditional on positive steps
by Belarus, whilst not going so far as to threaten the regime. While it cannot be entirely ruled out that President
Lukashenka would remain in power even if free elections were held tomorrow, the current regime will never accept
sweeping changes in politics, not least because such external intervention would present it as weak.
Second, a possible package could include a clear roadmap of what would follow if Minsk makes the first step and
releases its political prisoners. Belarus could thus be allowed to immediately begin to reap benefits, which would
then increase if Lukashenka proceeds with administrative and economic modernisation and allows the transfer of
expertise which, in turn, could strengthen the regime’s independence from Moscow.
It is important to stress that, by agreeing to such roadmap, the EU would not betray its own principles but only follow
the logic of relative differentiation, of distributing benefits based on changes from a previous state of affairs.
Engagement of civil society should not be given up on, but perhaps it would less complicate relations with the
regime if it were carried out by a few interested member states rather than by the EU as a whole. Some pragmatic
constraint in rhetorical terms, avoiding the impression that the Union is on a civilising mission in the neighbourhood,
could also be welcome.
It is by no means guaranteed that Lukashenka would agree to the offer. And he is not omnipotent: pressure by
spoilers, both internal and external, would undoubtedly occur. In other words, making the package acceptable is not
a sufficient condition for a positive outcome; it is, however, a necessary one. It is also preferable to a policy that is
unlikely to yield positive results in the foreseeable future.
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